The Great War by Hart Peter

Author:Hart, Peter [Hart, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub, pdf
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2013-08-27T04:00:00+00:00

12

MESOPOTAMIA, 1914–18

‘It was believed to be a sideshow and “no man’s child”.’1

Lieutenant General George Gorringe, Headquarters, Tigris Corps

THE ORIGINS OF THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN lay at sea with the adoption by the Royal Navy of oil-fired turbines for the new generations of warships that were rolling off the stocks. Much of Britain’s oil supply was sourced from the recently developed oil fields at Ahwaz in the Arabistan province of Persia. The oil pipeline ran alongside the Karun River to the Shatt al-Arab and the refineries on Abadan Island. Turkish-controlled Mesopotamia itself was the alluvial plain formed by the mighty Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as they meandered their way to the Persian Gulf, joining together before passing by the town of Basra which lies at the head of the Shatt al-Arab estuary about seventy miles from the sea. The importance of an uninterrupted oil supply to the British meant that it was essential that Abadan be secured from disruption as the likelihood of Turkey joining the war grew ever greater in the autumn of 1914. Indeed, in August, Turkish troops had already been mobilised and moved forward into the Basra region, occupying an area right down to the entrance of the Shatt al-Arab. The Royal Navy had despatched the sloop Espiegle, accompanied by an armed merchantman the Dalhousie, to lie off Abadan as a tangible representation of Britain’s concern. Furthermore, the Indian government was ordered to raise and despatch a land force in case military operations were required. Yet right from the start there was confusion over the chain of command.

A 1912 agreement had laid out the support required from India in the event of war and this included taking responsibility for any possible campaigns within the area of the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. Officially, therefore, the Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF) ‘D’ was to be raised by, and under the control of, the British-run Indian government based at Delhi.2 However, there is no doubt but that the British government in London still retained not just a paternalistic interest but a desire to interfere directly in the conduct of operations. This may not have mattered but, right from the start, the two governments had markedly different strategic visions: London was engaged in a continental war in Europe and had its eye on the Turkish threat to the Suez Canal and Egypt. Hence it looked to mount an essentially defensive campaign in Mesopotamia tailored to securing the oil fields and not much else. In contrast, although initially reluctant to do anything due to commitments elsewhere and the continuing threat on the North-West Frontier, Delhi soon came to envisage a full-scale campaign, intended to bring not just Abadan, not just the town of Basra, but the whole of Mesopotamia right up to Baghdad under British control. The Indian Army had been undergoing a prolonged period of economy due to the perceived reduction of the threat emanating from Russia, and the prevailing expectation was that it would only be deployed internally on the North-West Frontier. Therefore,

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